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Abstract
In a two-period overlapping generations model, this paper demonstrates that the
relationship between the environmental taxation and the economic activity (level- and
growth-output) becomes inverted-U shaped, when the detrimental impact of pollution
on health and the private decision of each working-age agent to improve her health
are taken into account. Especially, a tighter environmental tax is more likely to
promote (rather than to harm) output-level and -growth when health is very sensitive
to pollution, the weight of health in preferences is high, the polluting capacity of the
production technology is high and the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low.
The inverted-U shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the economic activity is due to a positive effect arising from the competition for resources
between the final output sector and the health-enhancing activities that offsets the
conventional detrimental “drag-down effect” for low values of the environmental tax.
We also demonstrate that the link between the environmental tax and the lifetime
welfare is inverted-U shaped as well. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and
the determinants of the optimal environmental tax.
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Introduction

Is environmental policy harmful to economic activity, both in terms of output level and
growth? Does the reduction of pollution imply a cost for economic activities so heavy that
the gains from a better environment quality are not able to offset it? At the theoretical
level, the answers are not clear-cut.
The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate focusing on one of the more
striking features of pollution: its detrimental impact on health. Conversely to previous
works in the field that take into account the impact of pollution on life expectancy (i.e.
mortality), we focus our attention on the influence of pollution on illness and disability
(morbidity). Indeed, a growing set of empirical evidence find a link between pollution and
chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, hypertension, stroke, heart disease, pulmonary
conditions and mental disorders, amongst others. Even if pollution is not the main source
of these diseases, it contributes as a factor favouring their emergence or their worsening.
Conversely to mortality that affects mainly the oldest old, illness and disability due to
chronic diseases primarily impacts the working-age population, leading to important losses
of productivity and rising health-expenditures mainly for the 30-50 old age people. Devol
and Bedroussian (2007) from the Milken Institute estimate that the seven common chronic
diseases represent for the United-States $277 billion spent annually on treatment and a
lost productivity equals to $1.1 trillion per year.
The rising health-expenditures for working-age people and the time they have to devote in order to accommodate to their chronic disease creates a competition for resources
that could be used in alternative ways, especially growth-led activities or final production
activities.1 The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that such a resource
competition is a channel of transmission between the environmental policy, economic activity and welfare, when the detrimental impact of pollution on health status of working-age
population is taken into account.
To demonstrate this point and analyze its implications, we use a two-period overlapping generations model in the veins of previous articles which addressed intergenerational
environmental issues,2 introducing an explicit link between the environment and health.
Following empirical evidence, we assume that health is negatively influenced by pollution
but is improved by the investment in health-enhancing activities made by each agent at her
working-age.3 Pollution is a by-product of final output production and in the competitive
1

Competition for resources in the relation between health and growth has been already studied by several
articles (see Dormont et al., 2007, for details and references). Nevertheless, most of these contributions
view better health as an increase in life expectancy. Empirically, Dormont et al. (2006) find changes in
morbidity that induce savings which more than offset the increase in spending due to population ageing.
2
For example, John and Pecchenino (1994) who analyze the potential conflict between economic growth
and the maintenance of environmental quality when consumption degrades environmental quality while
investment in environmental maintenance promotes it. See also John et al. (1995) who investigate the
effects of environmental taxation distinguishing the horizon of the agents and the economy. For models
with non-renewable resources, see Agnani et al. (2005), Kemp and Long (1979), Mourmouras (1991, 1993).
3
Because we consider that agents are suffering from chronic diseases that required medical care when
they are young we do not assume that the poor health agents expend more on medical care when they are
elderly like Gutiérrez (2008). And, conversely to Williams (2002, 2003), we do not assume that ill agents
do not work.
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economy the government taxes final output to limit pollution emissions.
Our first contribution is to demonstrate that if the detrimental effect of pollution on
health-status and an endogenous investment in health by the working-age are taken into
account, the link between the environmental taxation and the economic activity (final
output level and growth) is inverted-U shaped. Indeed, a tighter environmental policy has
two opposite effects. First, because the environmental tax is imposed on final output, it
reduces the rewards to production factor: the conventional “drag-down effect”. Second, it
reduces pollution and therefore improves health-status of the working-age. Agents reduce
their investment in health-enhancing activities and the freed resources are used to increase
consumption and production. This second effect, called “resource competition effect” is
positive. Therefore, for low values of the environmental tax, the second effect offsets the
first one, and the environmental policy promotes the level and the growth rate of output,
as well as the global welfare.
Our second contribution is to show that the greater the room for an improvement in
the health status, the more likely the environmental policy promotes economic activity
and growth. That occurs when the rate of natural health decay is low, the efficiency
of the health care spending is low, the weight of health in preferences is high, the part
of labor in final output is high, the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low, the
polluting capacity of production technology is high, the detrimental impact of pollution
on health and the elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution
are high. Most of these criterions exist in the most developed countries, and because
the detrimental impact of pollution on health is well-documented worldwide, our results
show that an active environmental policy in these countries is highly probable to promote
growth and output level: the positive gains in terms of health and growth should be higher
than the losses from factor rewards.
Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the optimal environmental tax. We
demonstrate that the higher the weight of health in preferences, the elasticity of pollution
stock with respect to the net flow of pollution, the detrimental impact of pollution on
health and/or the part of labor in production, the higher the optimal environmental tax
is.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 gives empirical evidence on the link between
pollution illness and disability. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 studies the competitive equilibrium and the impact of the environmental taxation on the steady-state.
Section 5 investigates the social optimum and the optimal environmental tax. Section 6
examines two extensions: AK endogenous growth and the introduction of the impact of
health on labor productivity. Section 7 concludes.

2

Pollution, illness and disability

The major part of the environmental economic contributions integrating the detrimental
impact of pollution on health focus on life expectancy.4 Nevertheless, pollution also affects
4

Among others, see Jouvet et al. (2007), Mariani et al. (2008), Varvarigos (2008) or Pautrel (2008,
2009). The aforementioned articles by Gutiérrez (2008) and Williams (2002, 2003) are exceptions.

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

3

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 372 [2009]

morbidity by favouring or worsening some chronic diseases that do not always lead to death
but have durable detrimental impacts in terms of illness and disability.
These chronic diseases, that encompasse cancer, diabetes, hypertension, stroke, heart
disease, asthma, obesity are a growing burden because they represent 60% of all deaths
worldwide and they are a major source of disability (see WHO, 2004, 2005). While they
strongly strike down developing countries, they also represent a great burden for developed
economies, like the United-States, England, Canada, Israel, and Australia, as reported by
Suhrcke et al. (2006b) and Zhang et al. (2008) amongst others. For example, Devol and
Bedroussian (2007) find that more than half of all Americans (55.8%) suffered from one
or more chronic diseases in 2003.
The causes of increasing the risk to develop chronic diseases are well-established and
well-known: mainly unhealthy diet, physical inactivity and tobacco use. Nevertheless,
recent studies emphasize the importance of the environmental factors in the development
and the worsening of some of these chronic diseases, especially in the developed countries.
According to Briggs (2003) about 8-9% of the total disease burden may be attributed to
pollution in developed countries.5
In the case of air pollution for example, it is well-established that particulate matter
pollution, Nitrogen dioxide, Sulfur dioxide and ozone favour the onset of asthma crisis
and aggravate respiratory diseases, that carbon monoxide affects mental function... (for
a study on European countries see Katsouyanni, 2003). Furthermore, particulate matter
air pollution plays a role as a cause of the development (pathogenesis in medical terms) of
cardiovascular disease (Brook et al., 2004) or lung cancer (Pope et al., 2002), and it may
be particularly harmful to high-risks people with diabetes and people with hypertension
(Pope and al., 2004). Moreover, air pollution could be deleterious to vascular health
especially for people with diabetes (Rajagopalan et al., 2005; O’Neill et al., 2005). Water
pollution [Paulu et al. (1999), Valent et al. (2004)] and industrial pollution [Nadal et al.
(2004), Chen and Liao (2005), Schuhmacher and Domingo (2006)] are also reported as
detrimental for health.
Lang et al. (2008) recently found that higher unary BPA concentration (chemical pollution) are associated with cardiovascular diagnoses and with diabetes for adults. Smink
et al. (2008) show that children in the higher exposure group of HCB (a pesticide extensively used before it was banned from the United-States) had an increased risk of being
overweight and obese, even if the mother is normalweight. The epidemiological association
between persistent organic pollutants and diabetes has been also demonstrated by Rylander et al. (2005) and Porta (2006). Even if such an association does not prove necessarily
a causal relation, as noted by Jones et al. (2008), such a causal link could be biologically
explained (see Remillard and Bunce, 2002).
Furthermore, the link between obesity and diabetes seems to be related to pollution.
Lee et al. (2007) find that the expected association between obesity and diabetes is absent
in people with low concentrations of persistent organic pollutants in their blood. Furthermore, they find that the association between obesity and diabetes become stronger as
5

The British Medical Bulletin gathers several studies on the impact of environmental pollution on health
in the issue 1 of the volume 68, in 2003
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the concentrations of such pollutants in the blood increase. Lockwood (2002) give further
references on the association between exposure to dioxins and the development of diabetes
or altered insulin metabolism. He notes that obesity may increase the risk of diabetes: because insulin is concentrated in body fat, obese individuals are likely to have an increased
dioxin body burden that could explain the link between the rise in the prevalence of diabetes and the “epidemic” of obesity (see also Ando et al., 2002, for empirical evidences).
One important feature of chronic diseases is that they do not affect only the oldest
people. It impacts working-age people through illness and disability: according to the
World Health Organization (WHO, 2004) 56% of those who support the burden of disease
are people age 15-59 in high-income countries. Lakdawalla et al. (2004) demonstrate
that the disability increases more rapidly for the young while it decreases for the elderly.
They find that one responsible is the growth in asthma which appears to be enough to
explain the change in disability. This is confirmed by Bhattacharya et al. (2008): “Recent
work has shown that rates of severe disability, measured by the inability to perform basic
activities of daily living, have been rising in working age populations. At the same time,
the prevalence of important chronic diseases has been rising, while others falling, among
working age populations. Chronically ill individuals are more likely than others to have
activity of daily living limitations. ” Perlkowski and Berger (2004) study the influence of
health on working conditions (wages and hours worked) making distinction between shortterm and long-term illness and the age at each illness appears (because it implies different
adjustments for young people at early stage and for old people closed to retirement). They
distinguish between temporary and permanent illness and find that the adverse effects of
permanent health problems peak with an age of onset in the 40s for men and in the 30s
for women. The biggest decline in wages and hours worked are observed for individuals
whose problems started at those ages.
That leads to major economic impact in terms of labor productivity, labor supply, education or savings, as shown by Suhrcke et al. (2006a). Chronic diseases mainly conduce
to a reduction of the productivity of the labor-force (even if agents are not sick enough to
stop working or even if he is not sick but it is the member of her family who is sick) and the
increase in disability of working people. For the US in 2003, Davis et al. (2005) estimated
that 55 million workers over 148 million ages 19 to 64 reported the inability to concentrate
at work because of their own illness or that of their family and 69 million workers reported
missing days due to illness. About the effects of chronic diseases on workers’ productivity,
Blanc et al. (2001) demonstrate, with a sample of 125 adults in Northern-California that
“Both asthma and rhinitis negatively affect work productivity. Those with asthma are
less likely to be employed at all, while among those remaining on the job, rhinitis is a
more potent cause of decreased work effectiveness. The economic impact of asthma and
rhinitis and related conditions may be under-appreciated”. For Australia, van Leeuwen
et al. (2006) estimate that “while the impact of reduced work effectiveness on days worked
with pain on productivity is uncertain, it has the potential to account for the majority
of lost productivity costs associated with chronic pain.”. Devol and Bedroussian (2007)
from the Milken Institute estimate that the seven common chronic diseases represent for
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009
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the United-States lost productivity equals to $1.1 trillion per year.
The second important features of chronic illness comes from that it places a burden on
health care and welfare systems. For the United States in 2003, Devol and Bedroussian
(2007) estimate that $277 billion are spent annually on treatment. All these resources could
be used in alternative activities promoting final (non health) consumption and growth. 6
Furthermore, chronic illness has major implications in terms of occupational choices,
that can not be supported (or funded) by public health-care system or insurance contracts.Since the Grossman’s seminal work of 1972, time besides goods appears as an important input of the health production function by influencing the next period’s health
capital level. More recently, time and time costs in health production become important
in the economic analysis of obesity for example (see Cutler et al., 2003; Philipson and
Posner, 2008, for example). As emphasized by Mullahy and Robert (2008), increasing
level of physical activities is now viewed as a mean to improve health outcomes. In their
study based on the Bureau of Labor Satistics’ American Time Use Survey Russell et al.
(2007) noted that 11.3% of American adults (in 2003-2004) reported spending time (mean,
108 minutes) on activities related to health on their designed day and 5.6% (86 minutes)
reported making medicine, giving self a shot, exercising or therapy for medical reasons.
Physical activity has been shown to reduce the risk of developing or dying from heart
diseases, diabetes, colon cancer and high blood-pressure. The US Department of Health
and Human services gives some advice for being in good health to make each week 150
minutes of physical activities at moderate level or 75 minutes at vigourous level.
As a result, chronic illness force agents to allocate more time to health-enhancing
activities, time they could use to home or market production. Therefore, both the increase
in health-care expenditures and the rising investment in health-enhancing activities lead
to a competition for resources that could be detrimental for economic activity, growth
and/or welfare. And because pollution favours chronic illness and disability, this influence
could be a new channel of transmission between the environmental public policy and the
economy.
We investigate that point in the following sections.

3

The model

Let’s consider an overlapping generations model. A new generation is born at each date
t = 1, 2, ..., and lives for two periods. The number of individuals born at time t is L.
Population is constant. Individuals are non-altruistic: the old do not care for the young
and the young do not care for the old. The preferences of an agent born in period t are
represented by the following utility (from van Zon and Muysken (2001)):




φ
1−φ
+
θ
log
c
h
log cφ1t h1−φ
t
2t+1 t+1
6

Here, we are reasoning for a given life expectancy and we do not consider that life expectancy may
rise or decrease. As a result, we do not integrate the fact that additional years of life increases health-care
expenditures (see Suhrcke et al., 2008, p.15).

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper372

6

6

Pautrel: Health-enhancing Activities and the Environment: How Competi

where c1t and c2t+1 are respectively consumption in young and in old age, ht and ht+1 are
respectively private health-status in young and in old age. Parameter θ = (1 + ι)−1 where
ι > 0 is the subjective discount rate of the agent. Parameters φ > 0 (respectively 1 − φ)
captures the relative importance of consumption (respectively health), in utility.7
Each young agent is endowed with one unit of time. She supplies νt ∈ [0, 1[ of this unit
of time in final production and uses her remaining time 1 − νt as an investment in health
care activities to improve her health status.8 She earns a wage income νt wt where wt is
the wage rate.
The private health status of an agent born at period t evolves from period t and period
t+1 according to two opposite forces (Aisa and Pueyo (2004)). On the one hand, biological
processes involve a natural decay of health simply as time passes. Following Grossman
(1972) and Cropper (1981) we further assume that health depreciates over time with the
stock of pollution (denoted St ). On the other hand, the time invested in health-enhancing
activities (1 − νt ) fights against this deterioration. Therefore, for an agent born at t,
private health status evolves from period t to period t + 1 as:
ht+1 − ht = η(1 − νt ) − ξStγ ht

(1)

with η > 0 is a productivity scalar of health-enhancing activities.9 . Parameter γ ≥ 0
measures the influence of pollution stock on the natural decay ξ ∈]0, 1[.10
A consumer, born at t, works during the first period of her life, consumes an amount
c1t and saves the remainder of her revenue. The budget constraint of a young is
c1t + st = νt wt
where st denotes saving in young. The budget constraint of an old is
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1 )st
where rt+1 is the interes rate paid on saving held from period t to t + 1.
Firms operate through perfect competition using physical capital and labor to produce
a final good with a constant return Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = Ãt Ktα Nt1−α ,

α ∈]0, 1[

7

We do not integrate green preferences because we will assume in the following that health status is
affected by pollution.
8
We could assume that there exists a sector that produces health care services with labor and therefore
a part ν of labor is allocated to manufacturing production and a part 1 − ν is allocated to health-care
production. We would find the same qualitative results (see Appendix A). Consequently, what we call
investment in health-enhancing activities could be viewed as health-care expenditures. Our modelling has
the advantage to lead to a simpler exposition of the model and the results. In Appendix E, we demonstrate
that results are not modified when leisure time is introduced.
9
Note that here, we model a linear relationship between the health-enhancing activities and the evolution
of health-status which could be not empirically relevant. As demonstrated by Skinner et al. (2001): “nearly
20 percent of total Medicare expenditures appears to provide no benefit in terms of survival, nor is it likely
that this extra spending improves the quality of life”. Our assumption is made for simplicity.
10
We impose γ ≥ 0 to investigate the absence of a detrimental impact of pollution on health, that is
γ = 0. Nevertheless, it is expected that γ > 1, that is the higher the stock of pollution, the higher the
detrimental effect of pollution, even if there is no empirical evidence on such a linear relationship.
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where Yt is the aggregate output, Kt is the aggregate productive capital and Nt is labor. Ãt
is a productive scalar, assumed as constant for the moment: Ãt ≡ A. Capital depreciates
fully in the production process.11
The stock of pollution S from period t to period t + 1 increases because of the net
flow pollution in the current period t and decreases according to the rate of natural purification of pollutants µ ∈]0, 1[. The net flow of pollution in period t is the ratio between
pollution emissions in period t, denoted Et , and the abatement activities funded by the
government, denoted Dt . We assume, as conventional, that polluting emissions arise from
final production such that
Et = zYt ,

z ∈]0, 1[

Parameter z measures the polluting capacity of the technology. Consequently the stock
of pollution in period t + 1 is defined as:


zYt χ
St+1 =
+ (1 − µ)St
(2)
Dt
where χ > 0 is the exogenous elasticity of pollution stock with respect to the net flow of
pollution E/D.

4

The competitive equilibrium

The representative agent born in period t maximizes her utility function taking wages, the
interest rate and the stock of pollution as given. She chooses consumption at both ages
(c1t , c2t+1 ) and the proportion of time νt she uses in production:




φ
1−φ
+
θ
log
c
h
max
log cφ1t h1−φ
t
2t+1 t+1
{c1t ,c2t+1 ,νt }


c1t + st = νt wt
s.t. c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1 )st


ht+1 = η(1 − νt ) + (1 − ξStγ ) ht
The first-order condition gives saving:


θ
νt wt
st =
1+θ

(3)

and the allocation of time into production:
νt =

φ(1 + θ)
ht+1
η(1 − φ)θ

∈]0, 1[

(4)

Because νt < 1, the health status of the old ht+1 is bounded to

η(1 − φ)θ 12
.
φ(1 + θ)

11

The production process is over the course of a generation. If the annual depreciation rate is 10% (which
is empirically relevant), 96% of the capital stock is depreciated over the course of a 30 year generation.
Therefore, we assume that capital is fully used up in the production process. Considering a positive
depreciation rate would not change the qualitative results.
12
See van Zon and Muysken (1997, p.5) for a justification of the health status boundary. .
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We assume that abatement Dt is provided by the government as a public good and
financed by an environmental tax τ on the source of pollution Yt such that the public
budget is balanced at each date: Dt = τ Yt . The low of motion of the stock of pollution,
given by equation (2) becomes:
 z χ
St+1 =
+ (1 − µ)St
τ
Firms maximize their profit πt = (1 − τ )Yt − (1 + rt )Kt − wt Nt and the demand for
capital and labor is
(1 − τ )αYt /Kt = 1 + rt
(1 − τ )(1 − α)Yt /Nt = wt
The good market clearing yields:
Kt+1 = st L
and the labor market clearing equates labor demand Nt to labor supply νt L
Nt = ν t L
The competitive equilibrium may be summarized by the following relations:


θ
(1 − τ )AKtα (νt L)1−α
Kt+1 = (1 − α)
1+θ
φ(1 + θ)
νt =
ht+1
η(1 − φ)θ

⇒

νt =



−1 

(1 − φ)θ
γ ht
+1
1 + (1 − ξSt )
φ(1 + θ)
η

ht+1 = η(1 − νt ) + (1 − ξStγ )ht
 z χ
St+1 =
+ (1 − µ) St
τ

(5)

(6)
(7)
(8)

The steady-state is defined here as an equilibrium where physical capital, private
health-status, pollution stock and the allocation of labor in production are constant at
K ⋆ , h⋆ , S ⋆ and ν ⋆ respectively, defined as:
S ⋆ = S(τ ) ≡

(z/τ )χ
µ

(9)


 −1
(z/τ )χ γ
φ(1 + θ)
+ξ
h = H(τ ) ≡ η
(1 − φ)θ
µ

 −1

ξ(1 − φ)θ (z/τ )χ γ
⋆
ν = V(τ ) ≡ φ φ +
(1 + θ)
µ
⋆



(10)
(11)

Consequently, the health status and the allocation of time in production are positively
affected by the environmental tax τ .
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009
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From equations (5), (10) and (11), the steady-state value of the physical capital stock
is:
1

K ⋆ = A (1 − τ ) 1−α V(τ )
 1/(1−α)
1+θ
θ
L. Because Y ⋆ =
(1 − τ )−1 K ⋆ ,13 we
A
with A ≡ (1 − α)
1+θ
θ(1 − α)
obtain the steady-state value of final output as a function of the environmental taxation
τ:
−1

 χ γ
α
z
⋆
−χγ
1−α
Y = A1 (1 − τ )
τ
B+ξ
µ


1+θ
φ(1 + θ)
with A1 ≡ B
.
A and B ≡
θ(1 − α)
(1 − φ)θ




Proposition 1. When endogenous investment in private health-status and the detrimental impact of pollution on health are taken into account, the relationship between the
steady-state output and the environmental taxation has an inverted-U shape.
Below (respectively above) an environmental tax-level denoted τ̂ and defined as

  χ γ
 χ γ
α
z
α
z
χγ
−1
Bτ̂ −
+ χγ ξ
τ̂ −
= 0.
(12)
χγξ
µ
1−α
1−α
µ
a tighter environmental taxation rises (respectively lowers) the steady-state level of output
Y ⋆.
Proof. See Appendix B
To understand the basic mechanism of this result, let us remember that
α

Y ⋆ = A1 (1 − τ ) 1−α V(τ )
| {z } | {z }
Ia

(13)

Ib

The environmental tax influences the steady-state level of output through two channels:
the direct impact of the environmental taxation on the rewards to labor (see overbrace Ia
in equation 13) and the (indirect) impact on the allocation of labor into the manufacturing
sector (see overbrace Ib in equation 13).
The first one (negative) is the conventional “drag-down” effect of the environmental tax
α
that reduces factor rewards – captured by (1 − τ ) 1−α . The second one (positive) is a new
channel of transmission due to the “competition for resources” between health enhancing
activities and production activities that affects the supply of labor into the final production
sector ν ⋆ = V(τ ). Because pollution has a detrimental impact on the evolution of private
health-status, by reducing the net flow of pollution and therefore the stock of pollution, the
environmental policy improves the private health-status of the agents. Consequently, each
agent decides to reduce her investment in health enhancing activities (1 − ν ⋆ decreases)
13

Note that Kt+1 = st L =

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper372
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«

νt (1 − τ )(1 − α)Yt /νt =

10

„

θ
1+θ

«

(1 − τ )(1 − α)Yt .
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and to rise her labor supply to productive activities (ν ⋆ increases). In this way, the tighter
environmental tax frees ressources that were allocated to health enhancing activities and
that are now reallocated to production, leading to a higher level of steady-state output
and a steady-state physical capital. Consequently the competition for resources between
output production and health enhancing activities associated with the negative impact of
pollution to health is a source of a new channel trough which the environmental policy
may promote economic activity.
When γ = 0, the evolution of health-status is independent from pollution and therefore
the investment of each agent in health-enhancing activities is not affected by the environmental tax: ν ⋆ is independent from τ . In such a case, the competition for resources is not
affected by the environmental policy and only the “drag-down”effect remains: the environmental policy is detrimental for growth. In the same way, the “competition for resources
effect” does no longer hold when there is no endogenous investment in health-enhancing
activities.
Proposition 2. The endogenous investment in health and the detrimental impact of
pollution on health are two necessary conditions to obtain Proposition 1.
Proof. See above and Appendix B.
Considering the influences of parameters on the environmental tax-level τ̂ , enables to
understand why these two opposite effects of the environmental policy leads to an inversedU shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the steady-state output level.
These influences are summarized in the following table (see equation (12) in Proposition
1 and Appendix B for the demonstration):
ξ
−

η
−

φ
−

θ
+

α
−

µ
−

z
+

Table 1. Parameter Changes and Responses of τ̂
Because it is cumbersome to obtain analytically the influence of γ and χ on the taxlevel τ̂ , we use a numerical application. We first calibrate the model assuming that the
length of each period is 30 years, as usually in the literature. The first period covers
ages 20 to 50, and the second period covers ages 50 to 80. We use the U.S. economy
as benchmark. From De La Croix and Michel (2002), we choose α and θ following the
standard choice in the RBC literature, that is α = 0.36 and a quarterly psychological
discount factor equal to 0.99. It implies that θ = 0.99(4×30) = 0.3. We use the calibration
by van Zon and Muysken (1997) for the values of ξ and φ. Finally, parameter η is chosen
to obtain a private health-status higher than unity to enable the welfare to be positive.
Benchmark value of parameters are summarized in Table 2:
α
0.36

θ
0.3

φ
1/2

ξ
0.2

A
50

η
0.8

L
1

χ
1

µ
0.5

γ
1.5

Table 2. Benchmark value of parameters
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and the results of the numerical application is reported in Table 3

Benchmark
γ = 0.5
γ=1
γ=2
γ = 2.5
χ = 1.25
χ = 1.5
χ = 1.75
χ=2

τ̂
21.6%
7.77%
15.73%
25.97%
29.13%
23.14%
24.07%
24.65%
25.01%

ν̂ ⋆
0.896
0.90
0.894
0.901
0.907
0.909
0.921
0.930
0.937

Ŷ
9.73
10.77
10.12
9.48
9.31
9.769
9.821
9.875
9.928

ĥ⋆
2.068
2.089
2.065
2.080
2.094
2.099
2.125
2.146
2.163

Ŝ ⋆
1.84
5.15
2.54
1.54
1.37
1.667
1.515
1.387
1.279

Ŵ ⋆
1.28
1.46
1.35
1.23
1.20
1.28
1.29
1.293
1.298

Table 3. Steady-state τ̂ for different values of γ and χ
The third proposition stems from the Table 1 and Table 3.
Proposition 3. When the negative impact of the environment on health and the endogenous decision of each agent to invest her resources into health enhancing activities are
taken into account, we demonstrate that the environmental taxation will be more likely to
improve the steady-state level of output if the rate of natural health decay (ξ) is low, the
efficiency of the health care spending (η) is low, the weight of health in preferences (1 − φ)
is high, the part of labor in final output (1 − α) is high, the rate of natural purification
of pollutants (µ) is low, the polluting capacity of production technology (z) is high, the
detrimental impact of pollution on health (γ) and the elasticity of pollution stock with
respect to the net flow of pollution χ are high.
Proof. See Appendix B and Table 3.
When the detrimental effects of a dirty environment on health are important, the gains
in terms of health status to reduce the emissions of pollutant are very important and the
“competition for resources effect” that leads to an increase in labor supply runs beyond the
“drag-down effect” that reduces factor rewards and as a consequence saving and physical
capital accumulation. Neverthless, these positive gains diminish with the increase in the
tax rate because the possible improvements in health-status due to the tax are reducing.
In the same time, the losses from the reduction of factor rewards increase in the tax rate
such that for the environmental tax-level τ̂ , they offset the gains, and a further increase
in τ leads to a decrease in the steady-state output level.
Consequently, the greater the room for improving the environment and the private
health-status through the environmental policy, the more beneficial the environmental
policy is likely to be for the economy.
The numerical application also enables us to investigate the impact of the environmental taxation on the steady-state lifetime welfare, as well. As shown by Figure 1, there
exists a relationship that is inverted-U shaped for similar reasons than the relationship
between the steady-state output and the environmental tax is inverted-U shaped.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper372
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Figure 1: Steady-state lifetime welfare as a function of τ

5

Social optimum and the optimal environmental taxation

The purpose of this section is to investigate the determinants of the optimal environmental
taxation in the presence of endogenous investment in private health and detrimental impact
of pollution on private health.
In the centralized economy, the central planner aims at maximizing the welfare of
agents:




max
log cφ1 h1−φ + θ log cφ2 h1−φ
{c1 ,c2 ,ν,K,D}



Y = AK α (νL)1−α = Lc1 + Lc2 + D + K



h = η(1 − ν)/(ξS γ )
s.t.

S = (E/D)χ /µ



E = zY

As demonstrated in Appendix C, consumption at young and old age are related14
c̄1 = θc̄2
with
(1 − α)φ
c̄1 =
α(1 + θ)



Aαφ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

1/(1−α)

The optimal allocation of time to production is:
ν̄ = φ
and the optimal stock of physical capital is

1/(1−α)
Aαφ
K̄ =
φL
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
14

A bar ¯ denotes optimal value.
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Consequently, the optimal final output is

α/(1−α)
αφ
1/(1−α)
Ȳ = A
φL
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
Abatement activities is given by
D̄ =

(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ)
Ȳ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

and the optimal stock of pollution in the steady-state is


(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ χ
/µ
S̄ = z
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ)
Consequently, the optimal value of the environmental tax that enables the decentralized
economy to attain the optimal stock of pollution in the steady-state is
τ̄ =

(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ)
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

(14)

It comes from this expression the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The higher the weight of health in preferences (1 − φ), the elasticity of
pollution stock with respect to the net flow of pollution (χ), the detrimental impact of
pollution on health (captured by γ) and/or the part of labor in production (1 − α), the
higher the optimal environmental tax is.
Proof. From equation (14), it is straightforward that ∂ τ̄ /∂φ < 0, ∂ τ̄ /∂χ > 0, ∂ τ̄ /∂γ > 0
and ∂ τ̄ /∂α < 0.
Nevertheless, the optimal environmental tax is not sufficient to enable the steadystate equilibrium to be optimal because in the decentralized economy the agents do not
internalize the impact of their labor supply decisions on final output and the net flow of
pollution. Consequently, agents supply not enough time to output production. That’s
why, to obtain the optimal individual labor supply ν̄, the government have to subsidy the
health-enhancing activities at a rate (see Appendix D):
 χ γ 
−γχ
ξθ
z
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ)
ν
τ¯ = 1 −
(1 + θ) µ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ
The environmental tax τ̄ associated with the subsidy τ¯ν make the steady-state decentralized equilibrium optimal.

6

Extensions

6.1

AK endogenous growth

In this section, we consider that there exists external learning by doing à la Romer (1986),15
such that the productivity scalar Ãt evolves as physical capital:
Ãt = AKtα
15

Following Romer (1986), production factors remain paid at their marginal after environmental tax
cost.
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to obtain an interest rate independent from physical capital.
Consequently, the final output becomes
Yt = AKt (νt L)1−α
and the law of motion of physical capital is given by


θ
Kt+1 = (1 − α)
(1 − τ )AKt (νt L)1−α
1+θ
At the steady-state, physical capital and output evolves at a constant positive rate of
growth g⋆ ≡ Kt+1 /Kt − 1, that is, using equation (11)
⋆



′

g = A (1 − τ ) B + ξ



zχ
µ

γ

τ

−χγ

α−1


θ
AL1−α B 1−α . The influence of the environmental taxation on
with A ≡ (1 − α)
1+θ
the growth rate at the steady-state is given by


′

⋆

′



∂g /∂τ = −A B + ξ



(z/τ )χ
µ

γ α−1−1

τ −χγ ×

 γ


z
−1
B+ξ
1 + (1 − α)χγ(1 − τ )
µ

Consequently ∂g⋆ /∂τ > 0 if the last term in the right-hand side of the previous expression
is negative:
 γ

z
χγ
Bτ + ξ
1 + (1 − α)χγ(1 − τ −1 ) < 0
µ
Because the left-hand side of the inequality
is a monotonic increasing function of τ with

z γ
χγ
> 0, there exists a unique τ̂g defined as
lim = −∞ and lim = Bτ + ξ
τ →0
τ →1
µ
 γ

z
χγ
Bτ̂g + ξ
1 + (1 − α)χγ(1 − τ̂g−1 ) = 0
µ
such that for τ < τ̂g (respectively τ > τ̂g ) we have ∂g⋆ /∂τ > 0 (resp. ∂g⋆ /∂τ < 0).
Proposition 5. Under the assumption of a learning-by-doing source of growth à la Romer
(1986), the introduction of an endogenous private health care expenditures and a detrimental impact of pollution on health makes the environmental taxation policy good for
growth when the level of taxation is not too high.
Proof. See above.
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6.2

Health affects labor productivity

As emphasized in the introduction, chronic diseases affect the economy through the huge
losses of productivity they create. As a result, it is expected that a tighter environmental
taxation will reduce these losses of productivity by reducing pollution and increasing the
health-status of workers. To investigate how the “productivity effect” associated with
the “competition for resources effect” could improve further the beneficial impact of the
environmental policy, we introduce the impact of health on the productivity of labor.
We continue to consider that the poor health agents expend more on medical care when
they are young and not elderly like Gutiérrez (2008). We do not assume that ill agents do
not work (Williams (2002, 2003)). We rather consider that a better health-status makes
workers more productive and that absenteeism due to illness does not occur.16
The technology to produce final output becomes:
Yt = At Ktα (hεt Nt )1−α

(15)

where ε ≥ 0 measures the effect of health on labor productivity. The introduction of
health-dependent labor productivity lets the model unchanged except for the law of motion
of physical capital (equation 5):


θ
(1 − τ )AKtα (hεt νt L)1−α
(16)
Kt+1 = (1 − α)
1+θ
As a result, the steady-state value of physical capital becomes:
1

K ⋆⋆ = A (1 − τ ) 1−α V(τ )H(τ )ε
and the steady-state expression of final output is now:
−(1+ε)

 χ γ
α
z
−χγ
⋆⋆
1−α
τ
Y = A2 (1 − τ )
B+ξ
µ
with A2 ≡ A1 η ε .
Proposition 6. When the effect of health on labor productivity is taken into account, the
positive effect of the environmental tax on ouput-level is enhanced and the tax level under
which a thigher environmental tax increases output level is higher. The environmental
policy is more likely to promote final output.
Proof. The tax level, denoted τ̂ˆ, for which ∂Y /∂τ = 0 is
 χ γ

  χ γ
z
α
z
α
(1 + ε)χγξ
= 0.
τ̂ˆ−1 −
B τ̂ˆχγ −
+ (1 + ε)χγ ξ
µ
1−α
1−α
µ
It is straightforward that for ε = 0, τ̂ˆ = τ̂ . Furthermore the LHS of the equation is
increasing in ε because τ̂ˆ ∈]0, 1[. Therefore from the theorem of implicit function we find
that ∂ τ̂ˆ/∂ε > 0. Therefore τ̂ˆ > τ̂ when ε > 0.
16

We take into account presenteeism, i.e. a worker present but with reduced productivity rather than
absenteeism, i.e. a worker absent, because it accounts for not only worker health but also health of his
family. For the US in 2003, Davis et al. (2005) estimated that 55 million workers over 148 million ages 19
to 64 reported the inability to concentrate at work because of their own illness or that of their family.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper372

16

16

Pautrel: Health-enhancing Activities and the Environment: How Competi

7

Conclusion

This paper investigated how the environmental tax affects the economy (output-level and
-growth, welfare) when the detrimental impact of pollution on health is taken into account
and working-age individuals have to invest in health-care activities to limit the deleterious
influence of pollution.
In a two-period overlapping generations model, this paper demonstrates that the relationship between the environmental taxation and the economic activity (level- and growthoutput) becomes inverted-U shaped, when the detrimental impact of pollution on health
and the private decision of each working-age agent to improve her health are taken into
account. Especially, a tighter environmental tax is more likely to promote (rather than to
harm) output-level and -growth when health is very sensitive to pollution, the weight of
health in preferences is high, the polluting capacity of the production technology is high
and the rate of natural purification of pollutants is low.
The inverted-U shaped relationship between the environmental tax and the economic
activity is due to a positive effect arising from the competition for resources between the
final output sector and the health-care sector that offsets the conventional detrimental
“drag-down effect” for low values of the environmental tax.
We also demonstrate that the link between the environmental tax and the lifetime
welfare is inverted-U shaped as well. Finally, we investigate the social optimum and the
determinants of the optimal environmental tax.
This contribution shows that, besides life expectancy, there are other ways along which
pollution may affect health and health affects economic activity. Those ways may be new
channels of transmission of the environmental pollution to economic activity.
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Appendix
A

The basic model with a health sector

Let us consider in this section, that there exists in the economy a health sector that
produces an amount Ht of health-care services at period t, using labour and the following
technology
Ht = AH (1 − νt )
where AH is a productivity scalar and 1 − νt is the part of labour (normalized to unity)
allocated to the health sector.
Firms in the health sector operate under perfect competition and maximize their profit
mt Ht = wt (1 − νt ) such that:
mt AH = wt

(17)

The final output sector is always defined in section 2.
In the competitive equilibrium, besides her consumption of final good, the consumer
buys when she is young Ht units of health care services for an amount of health-care
expenditures equal to mt Ht . The private health status of the agent evolves between
period t and t + 1 as:
ht+1 − ht = ηHt − ξStγ ht
The program of the consumer consists in choosing consumption when young and old
and health-care services Ht in order to maximize her lifetime utility subject to her budget
constraint when young and old and the evolution of her health-status:




φ
1−φ
+
θ
log
c
h
max
log cφ1t h1−φ
t
2t+1 t+1
{c1t ,c2t+1 ,Ht }


c1t + mt Ht + st = wt
s.t. c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1 )st


ht+1 = ηHt + (1 − ξStγ ) ht
The first-order condition gives saving (using equation 17):




θ
θ
(wt − mt Ht ) =
νt wt
st =
1+θ
1+θ

Furthermore, νt is given by
ht+1 =

ηAH (1 − φ)θ
νt
φ(1 + θ)

that is νt increases in ht+1 . These two expressions are similar to those find with health-care
investment as time (see equations (3) and (4)) when AH = 1.
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B

Environmental taxation in the competitive equilibrium

The influence of the environmental tax on the steady-state level of output is given by:
⋆

⋆ −γχ

dY /dτ = Y τ

−1





zχ
µ

γ

−χγ

−1

(1 − τ )
B+ξ
×
τ

  χ γ 

 χ γ
α
z
α
z
−1
χγ
τ −
Bτ −
+ χγ ξ
.
χγξ
µ
1−α
1−α
µ

The influence of the environmental tax on the steady-state level of output is positive
if and only if
 χ γ

  χ γ
z
α
z
α
−1
χγ
χγξ
τ −
>0
Bτ −
+ χγ ξ
µ
1−α
1−α
µ
Because the left-hand side of the
 inequality
 χ γis
 a decreasing monotonic function of τ with
z
−α
B+ξ
< 0, there exists a unique τ ∈]0, 1] under
lim = +∞ and lim =
τ →0
τ →1
1−α
µ
which the inequality is verified. This τ is denoted τ̂ and is defined as:
 χ γ

  χ γ
z
α
z
α
χγξ
Bτ̂ χγ −
+ χγ ξ
τ̂ −1 −
= 0.
µ
1−α
1−α
µ
When γ = 0, the left-hand side of the inequality is independent from τ and negative.
Consquently, when γ = 0, we have dY ⋆ /dτ < 0.
To find how parameters affect the tax level τ , let rewrite the expression of τ̂ as:
 χ γ
 
z
χγ
−1
−1
Γ(τ̂ ; α, γ, ξ, µ, B, z, χ) ≡ Bτ̂ + 1 − α (1 − α)χ τ̂ − 1 γ ξ
= 0.
µ
φ(1 + θ)
and τ̂ −1 > 1. Except for γ and χ, it is straightforward that ∂Γ(·)/∂ξ >
(1 − φ)θ
0, ∂Γ(·)/∂B > 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂α > 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂µ > 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂z < 0, ∂Γ(·)/∂ τ̂ > 0. From the
theorem of implicit function, we obtain
with B ≡ η

∂ τ̂ /∂ξ < 0,

∂ τ̂ /∂η < 0,

∂ τ̂ /∂φ < 0,

∂ τ̂ /∂(1−φ) > 0,

∂ τ̂ /∂α < 0,

C

∂ τ̂ /∂µ < 0,

∂ τ̂ /∂θ > 0,
∂ τ̂ /∂z > 0.

The optimum

In the centralized economy, the central planner aims at maximizing the welfare of agents:




max
log cφ1 h1−φ + θ log cφ2 h1−φ
{c1 ,c2 ,ν,K,D}



F (K, ν, L) = ÃK α (νL)1−α = Lc1 + Lc2 + D + K



h = η(1 − ν)/(ξS γ )
s.t.

S = (E/D)χ /µ



E = zY
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The Lagrangian may be written as:
L = φ (log c1 + θ log c2 ) + (1 + θ)(1 − φ) (χγ log D − χγ log F (K, ν, L) + log(1 − ν))
ηµγ
+ (1 + θ)(1 − φ) log γχ + λ (F (K, ν, L) − Lc1 − Lc2 − D − K)
ξz
First-order conditions are
φc−1
1 = λL

(18)

θφc−1
2 = λL
that is
c2 = θc1
′
′
(·)/F (·)
λ(FK
(·) − 1) = (1 + θ)χγ(1 − φ)FK

(1 − φ)(1 + θ) γχFν′ (·)/F (·) + (1 − ν)−1 = λFν′ (·)

λ = (1 + θ)χγ(1 − φ)D −1

(19)
(20)
(21)

Equations (19) and (21) give:
′
D = Y (1 − 1/FK
(·)) = Y − α−1 K

Furthermore, from (18), we obtain λ =

φ
, consequently
c1 L

D = φ−1 (1 + θ)χγ(1 − φ)c1 L
and consequently the market equilibrium gives


Y = c1 L(1 + θ) 1 + φ−1 χγ(1 − φ) + K
that is
c1 L =

Y −K
(1 + θ) [1 + φ−1 χγ(1 − φ)]

In the same way, the market equilibrium may be written as
Y = (1 + θ)c1 L + K + Y − α−1 K
that is
(1 + θ)c1 L = (α−1 − 1)K
Consequently
Y −K
= (α−1 − 1)K
[1 + φ−1 χγ(1 − φ)]
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper372
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that is
Y = α−1 φ−1 [(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ] K
Finally, equation (20) gives

(1 − φ)(1 + θ) (1 − α)γχ +

ν
1−ν



(22)

=

φ(1 + θ)
(1 − α)Y /K
(α−1 − 1)

that is
φ
ν
=
1−ν
1−φ

⇒

ν=φ

From (22), we can obtain the express of the steady-state physical capital in the centralized economy, denoted Kc :
K̄ =



Aαφ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

1/(1−α)

φL

and from (22)
1/(1−α)

Ȳ = A



αφ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

α/(1−α)

φL

1/(1−α)

φ

Finally
(1 − α)
c̄1 =
α(1 + θ)



Aαφ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

and
D̄ =

D

(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ)
Ȳ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

Subsidy to health-enhancing activities

We re-write the competitive equilibrium assuming that the government subsidies the
health-enhancing activities by agent by paying a subsidy τ ν to the opportunity cost of
health-enhancing activities (that is the foregone wage (1 − νt )wt ) that is funded by a
lump-sum tax denoted at .
The budget-constraint for the young born at period t becomes:
c1 + st + at = νt wt + τ ν (1 − νt )wt
θ
(νt wt + τ ν (1 − νt )wt − at ) and
1+θ
because government budget constraint requires at = τ ν (1 − νt )wt , we obtain
The maximization of lifetime utility gives st =

st =

θ
νt wt
1+θ
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and the individual labor supply is given by
νt =

(1 + θ)φ
(1 − τ ν )ht+1
θ(1 − φ)

In the steady-state equilibrium, the private health-status remains constant at:

 −1

(z/τ )χ γ
⋆
ν φ(1 + θ)
+ξ
h = H(τ ) ≡ η (1 − τ )
(1 − φ)θ
µ


 −1
(z/τ )χ γ
ξ(1 − φ)θ
⋆
ν = V(τ ) ≡ φ φ +
(1 − τ ν )(1 + θ)
µ
The higher the subsidy to health-enhancing activities, the higher the health-status in
the steady-state and the lower the individual supply of labor ν ⋆ .
The subsidy to health-enhancing activities that enables to replicate the optimal allocation of time between health-enhancing activities and production (denoted τ¯ν ) is such
that ν ⋆ = φ, that is
 χ γ 
−γχ
ξθ
z
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ)
τ¯ν = 1 −
(1 + θ) µ
(1 − α)χγ(1 − φ) + φ

E

The competitive equilibrium with leisure

Until here, we investigate the competition for resources assuming that the time unit at the
disposal of the agent is divided between two different “occupational” activities: production
which enables to earn an income and investment in health care which enables the agent
to stay in good health.
In this section, we consider that each agent also values leisure-time and that he may
adjust his leisure-time according to the level of his health-status: the healthier is the agent,
the greater is the utility of one minute of leisure.
To do so, we continue to denote ν ∈]0, 1[, the part time the agent chooses in output
production and we denote u ∈]0, 1[ the part time spent as investment in health status.
Consequently 1 − u − ν ∈]0, 1[ represents the part-time
To keep things simple, preferences are written as follows




φ
1−φ
φ1
+
θ
log
c
h
log cφ1t h1−φ
(1
−
u
−
ν
)
t
t
t
2t+1 t+1
with φ1 > 0 captures the weight of leisure in utility.
The law of motion of the private health-status (equation 1) is modified as follows
ht+1 − ht = ηut − ξStγ ht
and in the competitive equilibrium, the program of the agent is




1−φ
max
log cφ1t h1−φ
(1 − ut − νt )φ1 + θ log cφ2t+1 ht+1
t
{c1t ,c2t+1 ,νt ,ut }


c1t + st = νt wt
s.t. c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1 )st


ht+1 = ηut + (1 − ξStγ ) ht
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The expression of savings st is the same than equation (3) and the part-time into
output production νt is still given by equation (4). But now, the part-time in health care
expenditures:
ut = 1 −

φ(1 + θ)
φ1
φ(1 + θ) + φ1
ht+1 −
ht+1 = 1 −
ht+1
η(1 − φ)θ
η(1 − φ)θ
η(1 − φ)θ

and the part-time to leisure is
1 − ut − ν t =

φ1
ht+1
η(1 − φ)θ

The competitive equilibrium may be summarized by the following relations:


θ
Kt+1 = (1 − α)
(1 − τ )AKtα (νt L)1−α
1+θ
νt =

φ(1 + θ)
ht+1
η(1 − φ)θ

ht+1 = ηut + (1 − ξStγ )ht
φ(1 + θ) + φ1
ht+1
η(1 − φ)θ
 z χ
St+1 =
+ (1 − µ) St
τ
In the steady-state, ν, u, h, S, K, Y remain constant. Consequently, the stock of
pollution in the steady-state S ⋆ is always given by (9), and the private health-status is

 χ γ
−1
z
−χγ
⋆
′
τ
h =η B +ξ
µ
ut = 1 −

φ(1 + θ) + φ1
. When leisure is taken into account, the health care expenditures
(1 − φ)θ
is lowered and the steady-state health status too, but the influence of the environmental
tax is not modified.
The part-time into the output production is:

 χ γ
−1
z
ν ⋆ = B B′ + ξ
τ −χγ
µ

with B ′ ≡

Finally, we obtain
⋆

Y =

A′1

(1 − τ )

α
1−α



B+ξ



zχ
µ

γ

τ

−χγ

−(1+ε)




1+θ
A.
θ(1 − α)
Because A′1 < A1 , the steady-state level of output is lower when leisure is taken into
account, but the effect of the environmental taxation in the steady-state level of output
and the expression of τ , the environmental taxation under which a higher tax promotes
economic activities, are not modified.

with A′1 ≡ B ′
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